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Equal Protection and
Sexual Orientation
“Let all men be considered equal in the eye of the law.”
– Sir Stamford Raffles, 6 June 18231
Equality is the thread running through the fundamental liberties
enshrined in our Constitution. Intoned the Constitutional Commis-
sion of 1966: “Every citizen has equal rights and every individual
has equal rights... No one citizen ought to have less or more
rights than another citizen and similarly no one individual has
or ought to have less or more rights than another individual in
a democratic nation.”2 Equality, expressed in Art 12 of the Con-
stitution, is also a specific right enforceable by the court. The
difficulty comes in applying this deceptively simple concept to
real-life situations. As put by Mark Van Doren, equality is “the
greatest of all doctrines and the most difficult to understand.”
In considering the validity of legislation, Singapore and Malay-
sian courts have generally favoured rational review, a modest
conception of equal protection, unlike their American counterparts
“Raffles’ Singapore Regulations – 1823” (1968) 10 Mal LR 248 at 288.
Report of the Constitutional Commission 1966 at 5 para 22 (Tan, Yeo & Lee,
infra, n 4 at 796 (Appendix D)).
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which have adopted a more expansive reading in the form of strict
and intermediate review. This article examines how these three
levels of equal protection review operate, and argues that the
scheme of Art 12, explicit judicial and academic approval, and
policy support a wider interpretation of equal protection. As an
illustration, we will look at whether criminal exclusions of male
homosexual activity in private under ss 377 and 377A of the Penal
Code violate the right to equal protection.3
I. EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE:
STANDARDS OF REVIEW4
Breathtaking in its simplicity, Art 12(1) of the Constitution5 reads:
“All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal
protection of the law.” It is identical to Art 8(1) of the Malaysian
Federal Constitution from which it was derived. The Malaysian
provision was in turn based on Art 14 of the Constitution of
Homosexual solicitation and acts occurring in public, which are offences
under s 377A of the Code, will not be discussed. Some United States cases
have held that where sodomy is not a crime, homosexual solicitation should
not be a crime either: Pryor v Municipal Court (1979) 25 Cal 3d 238 at
253-54; People v Uplinger (1984) 467 US 246; Commonwealth v Sefranka
(1988) 382 Mass 108 at 118. It is submitted that solicitation and homosexual
acts committed in public should continue to be illegal just as their hetero-
sexual analogues are, for the protection of public sensibilities: see Jansen J
(dissenting) in Uplinger, and the Wolfenden Report, infra, n 43 at 42-44
paras 115-24.
American position: see Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (11th ed, 1988)
at 586-92; John E Nowak & Ronald D Rotunda, Constititutional Law
(4th ed, 1991) at § 14.3 pp 573-80; Gayle Lynn Pettinga, “Rational Basis
With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name” (1987) 62 Ind LJ 779
at 780-85. Indian position: see Mahendra P Singh, VN Shukla’s Constitution
of India (9th ed, 1994) at 37-75. Malaysian and Singaporean position: see
Kevin Tan, Yeo Tiong Min & Lee Kiat Seng, Constitutional Law in Malaysia
and Singapore (1991) at 598-616.
1992 Ed.
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India: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before
the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory
of India.” These provisions all share a common lineage from
s 1 of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution:
“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.” Given the similarity in wording
of the provisions, it is submitted that United States and Indian
cases can assist the interpretation of Art 12(1).6
Article 12(1) embodies two distinct concepts: “equality before
the law” and “equal protection of the law”. The first concept bars
the law from unfairly favouring one person while not disfavouring
anyone else.7 The latter concept applies when a person is the
victim of inequality, and will be the focus of our discussion.
Equal protection of the law does not mean that everybody
is to be treated in exactly the same way in the eyes of the law.
Rather, when a statutory provision is alleged to be discriminatory,
it is the court’s duty to examine it to ensure that it treats all
people in a particular class, and thus in a similar position with
See G Moganasundram, “Equal Protection in Malaya – A Comparative
Study” (1962) 5 Me Judice 56; Harry E Groves, “Equal Protection of the
Laws in Malaysia and India” (1963) 12 Amer J of Comp Law 385. Huang
Su Mien, in Equality Before the Law – Article 8: Constitution of the
Federation of Malaya (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Singapore,
1963), writes at 5: “[T]he Indian Constitution and that of the United States,
are pre-eminently suitable [for reference], since both guarantee equality
to all persons in terms corresponding closely to the Malayan article, and
moreover, both have the advantage of a plethora of cases attaching to their
interpretation.”
For instance, see PP v Tengku Mahmood Iskandar [1973] 1 MLJ 128 (HC,
Malaysia) (decision of lower court overturned because it awarded defendant
a lower sentence on the basis that he was a Prince of the ruling house of
the State of Johore). See LA Sheridan & Harry E Groves, The Constitution
of Malaysia (4th ed, 1987) at 58. Contrast Moganasundram, supra, n 6
at 56, and Huang Su Mien, “The Meaning of Equality Before the Law and
Equal Protection of the Laws”, supra, n 6 at 5-11, who find little practical
difference between the two concepts.
6
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Rational review may be termed the “traditional” standard of
review. It was the earliest to be applied and is evident in all four
jurisidictions. It is apparently the sole standard of review in India.
On the other hand, American courts have gone on to develop
heightened standards of review in the form of strict scrutiny, and
more recently, intermediate review. Strict scrutiny has been applied
in Malaysia, as will be evident from Part II of this article.
A. The Traditional Standard:
Rational or Deferential Review
Under rational review, the court generally defers to legislative
judgment. There is a presumption of constitutionality of the
statute in question. The burden of showing that the statute is
unconstitutional lies on the person alleging that it is invalid.9
It is well established that for a statute to be constitutional, it must
use a rational classification of persons founded on intelligible
differentia which distinguish persons within the classification
Yick Wo v Hopkins (1886) 118 US 356 at 367; Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris
v PP [1977] 2 MLJ 155 at 166 col 1G (FC, Malaysia); Ong Ah Chuan v PP
[1981] 1 MLJ 64 (PC on appeal from Singapore) at 72 cols 1I-2A.
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice SR Tendolkar [1958] AIR SC 538,
[1959] SCR 279 at 296-97 para (b); Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v PP
[1977] 2 MLJ 155 (FC, Malaysia) at 166 col 2E para 9; Malaysian Bar v
Government of Malaysia [1987] 2 MLJ 165 (SC, Malaysia) at 170 col 2F
para (c).
8
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respect to the law, in the same manner.8 Equal protection cases
from the United States, India, Malaysia and Singapore reveal
three distinct standards of review. From the lowest to the highest
standard, they are:
Rational or deferential review.
Intermediate review; and
Strict scrutiny.
(a)
(b)
(c)
from those left out of it. This rational classification must have
a rational nexus or relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the statute in question. This “rational nexus” test was laid
down in the Indian cases of Budhan Choudhry v State of Bihar10
and Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v Shri Justice SR Tendolkar,11 and
followed in Malaysia by Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v PP.12
The rational nexus test has been applied in Singapore. The
Privy Council on appeal from Singapore in Ong Ah Chuan v
PP,13 in ruling that there was nothing unconstitutional about a
mandatory death penalty for trafficking in certain quantities of
controlled drugs, noted that:
Provided that the factor which the legislature adopts as con-
stituting the dissimilarity in circumstances is not purely arbitrary
but bears a reasonable relation to the social object of the law,
there is no inconsistency with Art 12(1) of the Constitution.14
This was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Chng Suan Tze v
The Minister for Home Affairs.15 However in two other cases,
Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor, Property Tax, Singapore16
[1955] AIR SC 191 at 193 (SC, India).
Supra, n 9.
Supra, n 9. The rational nexus test was also applied in Malaysian Bar v
Government of Malaysia, supra, n 9; R Rethana v Government of Malaysia
[1988] 1 MLJ 133 (SC, Malaysia); Government of Malaysia v VR Menon
[1990] 1 MLJ 277 (SC, Malaysia); and Datuk Yong Teck Lee v PP [1993]
1 MLJ 295 (HC, Kota Kinabalu). Even before any decided cases, the applic-
ability of rational review in Malaya based on the Indian model was predicted
by several commentators: supra, n 6.
[1981] 1 MLJ 64.
Ibid at 72 col 2E (emphasis added).
[1989] 1 MLJ 69 at 82D-E. See also Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home
Affairs [1989] 2 MLJ 449 at 459 col 1G (HC).
[1981] 1 MLJ 51.
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and Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor & Comptroller of Prop-
erty Tax,17 the Privy Council did not apply the rational nexus
test. Instead they held that Art 12(1) would be violated if there
existed “inequalities... on a substantial scale”18 or “deliberate
and arbitrary discrimination”.19 These pronouncements are con-
sistent with the rational nexus test. If legislation shows “deliberate
and arbitrary discrimination”, it is clear that it must fail the
test.20
As rational distinctions may be made with substantially less
than mathematical exactitude,21 courts condone under- and over-
inclusiveness in the legislature’s classifications and may even
supply its own justifications for the classification in addition to
objectives put forth by the government.22 Therefore a provision
may not be discriminatory even if the classification used catches
too few or too many people needed to achieve the government’s
objective. Gunther has commented that the minimal scrutiny
applied in theory is virtually non-existent in fact.23
[1990] 1 MLJ 321.
Supra, n 16 at 53 col 2B.
Supra, n 17 at 324 col 1D.
Howe Yoon Chong v Chief Assessor & Comptroller of Property Tax was
applied in PP v Ang Soon Huat [1991] 1 MLJ 1 (HC, Singapore) at 6
col 2C, where the court held that “[a]rbitrariness implies the lack of any
rationality.”
Williamson v Lee Optical Co (1955) 348 US 483 at 489; Shri Ram Krishna
Dalmia, supra, n 9.
Pettinga, supra, n 4 at 783. On under- and over-inclusiveness, see Joseph
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, “The Equal Protection of the Laws” (1949)
37 Calif LR 341; Huang-Thio Su Mien, “Equal Protection and Rational
Classification” [1963] Public Law 412.
Gerald Gunther, “The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection” (1972) 15 Harv Civ Rights-Civ Lib L Rev 1 at 8.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
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Yet even a provision which satisfies the rational nexus test may
be invalid because the object sought to be achieved by the statute
is itself inherently bad.24 This limitation finds support in United
States and Indian case law. In Bidi Supply Co v Union of India25
Bose J held:
[O]ne can conceive of classifications. . . that will have direct
and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved
and yet which are bad because... the object itself is not to be
allowed on the ground that it offends Article 14. In such a
case the object itself must be struck down and not the mere
classification which after all, is only a means of attaining the
end desired.
B. The New Standard: Strict Scrutiny26
In the first 80 years after the enactment of the 14th Amendment
of the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court believed
that the Amendment protected only racial and ethnic minorities
from discrimination.27 But the 1940s saw the doctrine of strict
scrutiny conceived, and it was developed during the term of Chief
Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s. Its source was Stone CJ’s famous
fourth footnote in United States v Carotene Products Co,28 which
said that courts must use a “more searching judicial inquiry”
to protect groups that do not have the ordinary protection of
democratic rule because they are not able to participate effectively
in the political process.
Huang-Thio Su Mien, supra, n 22 at 422, 440. See also the cases cited
at 422-29.
[1956] AIR SC 479 at 486 para 18.
Pettinga, supra, n 4 at 780-82.
Strauder v West Virginia (1880) 100 US 303, Yick Wo v Hopkins (1886)
118 US 356.
(1938) 304 US 144 at 152 n 4.
24
25
26
27
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The Warren Court did not abandon rational review, but applied
it alongside strict scrutiny in a two-tier approach. Strict scrutiny
is only invoked when a statute either (1) impinges on the funda-
mental rights and interests of people, thus violating due process; or
(2) makes use of a “suspect classification”.29 It has been argued
in the United States that anti-sodomy statutes violate due process
by affecting the fundamental right of privacy of homosexuals; this
argument found its way to the United States Supreme Court but
was rejected in the important decision of Bowers v Hardwick.30
We will not concentrate on this aspect of strict scrutiny but on
whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class.
Unlike rational review, the burden of proof in strict scrutiny
is reversed: it is the government that must prove that the impugned
statute is constitutional. To survive strict scrutiny, a suspect classi-
fication in a statute must be “necessary to the accomplishment”31
of a “compelling state interest”.32 While absolute necessity is
not required, the court will require a close relationship or “tight
fit” between the classification and promotion of the compelling
governmental objective of the statute.33 The government’s policy
must be the least restrictive possible. At present the United States
Supreme Court recognises two suspect classifications: race or
national origin, and alienage.
Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law (11th ed, 1985) at 588.
(1986) 478 US 186.
McLaughlin v Florida (1964) 379 US 184 at 192.
Plyler v Doe (1982) 457 US 202 at 217.
Nowak & Rotunda, supra, n 4 at 575 § 14.3.
See generally, Note, “Quasi-Suspect Classes and Proof of Discriminatory
29
30
31
32
33
34
1. Indicia of a Suspect Class34
American cases have established several indicia which point towards
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(1) History of Discrimination, Stigma or Opprobrium: A “history
of purposeful unequal treatment”,35 stigma or opprobrium is a
mark of a suspect class. A group possessing a particular trait is
unfairly stigmatized if legislation excludes its members from the
political process or treats its members as persons of inferior status
because of the trait. Stigma is defined not only by an individual’s
subjective feelings of being stigmatized, but also by societal atti-
tudes towards individuals with the trait in question. People who
are stigmatized may even be psychologically damaged by the way
they are treated.36
A history of discrimination and stigma is not by itself sufficient
to trigger heightened scrutiny because it does not show if the
discrimination is unwarranted.37 For example, criminals have long
Intent: A New Model” (1981) 90 Yale LJ 912 at 917-19; Harris M Miller II,
“An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny
to Classifications Based on Homosexuality” (1984) 57 S Cal LR 797 at
809-16; Note, “The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexual-
ity as a Suspect Classification” (1985) 98 Harv L Rev 1285 at 1299-1305.
San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez (1973) 411 US 1
at 28-29.
Yale LJ, supra, n 34 at 917-18.
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
(1980) at 250 n 64.
35
36
37
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a suspect class. None of the indicia is by itself conclusive, but
a group of persons which possesses most of them is probably a
suspect class. The indicia are:
A history of discrimination and stigma or opprobrium.
The presence of incorrect stereotypes perpetuated by the
impugned law.
The immutability of the defining trait of the group.
The fact that the group is a “discrete and insular minority”.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
faced discrimination and stigma but discrimination against them
is justified either as a penalty or a safeguard.
Homosexuals as a class are generally stigmatized and denigrated
by many in society. In some countries this has taken serious forms
such as employment discrimination and “queer-bashing”.
(2) Incorrect Stereotypes: If a group is subjected to legal dis-
abilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics which do not
truly indicate their abilities,38 or laws which perpetuate incorrect
stereotypes,39 this suggests that the group is a suspect class. This
indicium is not conclusive because all legislative decisions are to
some degree based on stereotypes and so counter-examples can
always be found.40
Homosexuals are subject to many unfounded and highly de-
meaning stereotypes.41 For instance, they are often characterised
as being effeminate, likely to sexually assault or outrage the mod-
esty of defenceless children and to seduce “straight” males into
becoming gay, or to present role models that make homosexuality
so attractive that young people will embrace it as a lifestyle.
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v Murgia (1976) 427 US 307 at 313.
Mississippi University for Women v Hogan (1982) 458 US 718 at 729-30
(nursing school policy of excluding men perpetuated stereotyped notion of
nursing as a “woman’s job”).
Ely, supra, n 37 at 155-56.
In addition to the examples cited in the main text, note R v Bishop [1975]
QB 274 in which the defendant was tried for theft from a bedroom. He
explained the presence of his fingerprints in the bedroom by claiming that
he had a homosexual relationship with one of the prosecution’s witnesses
(which was denied). The Court of Appeal held that since an allegation
of homosexual immorality reflected on the credibility and reliability of
the prosecution witness, this fell within s 1(f)(ii) of the UK Criminal Evid-
ence Act 1898 entitling the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant on
his own criminal record. Is it correct to assume that the testimony of a
homosexual is less reliable than that of a heterosexual?
38
39
40
41
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But arguments that homosexuals as a class disproportionately
molest children have been discredited.42 Though pedophilia and
homosexuality may overlap, they are distinct conditions. The
appropriate way to prevent sexual abuse of children is to crim-
inalise pedophilia, not sodomy.43 The rape and the outraging of
In 1994, the police reported 405 cases of child sexual abuse in Singapore,
although professionals working with abused children feel that there may
have been more than 1,215 because of underreporting. Victims are usually
under 10, and the abusers are often their fathers or stepfathers. Studies
show that the rate of female child sexual abuse is higher than that for
males – a figure of 10 to 1 has been suggested: “Daddy, Don’t: Child Sex
Abuse: Almost Always in the Family”, Life!, 5 August 1995 at 2. However
the difference is not nearly as great as thought. It has been speculated that
underreporting of male child sexual abuse is due inter alia to the male ethic
of self-reliance, the stigma of homosexuality and tendency towards self-blame,
and a feared disbelief or unresponsiveness of parents and professionals.
In male sexual abuse cases most perpetrators are men, though the number
of female perpetrators is also severely underestimated, probably because
males are likely to see childhood sexual activity with older females not as
“abuse” but as benign or even positive: Matthew Parynik Mendel, The Male
Survivor: The Impact of Sexual Abuse (1995) at 40-71. Surprisingly, of the
men who perpetrate sexual abuses against boys, the vast majority identify
themselves as heterosexual: John C Gonsioreh, Walter H Bera, Donald
LeTourneau, Male Sexual Abuse: A Trilogy of Intervention Strategies
(1994) at 47. While correlational research suggests that male sexual abuse
victims are twice as likely to engage in homosexual behaviour, commentators
stress that no direct causal factor has been determined. It is suggested that
pedophiles may take advantage of the vulnerabilities of young males who
already have incipient homosexual tendencies: Mendel, at 169-72; Gonsioreh
et al, at 48.
Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution
(Cmnd 247, 1957) (the Wolfenden Report) at 23 para 57. Committing or
abetting the commission of, or procuring or attempting to procure the
commission by any person of, any obscene or indecent act with any child
or young person is a criminal offence under s 6 of the Children and Young
Persons Act (Cap 38, 1994 Ed). By s 2 of the Act, a “child” is a person
below age 14 while a “young person” is 14 or above and below 16. More
serious offenders can be charged under the Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985
Rev Ed) or Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1985 Rev Ed).
42
43
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modesty of adults are also more properly punished by specific
offences, not by a sanction which impacts on private homosexual
behaviour.44
To suggest that homosexuals can seduce straight men into
becoming gay implies that the homosexual preference in men is
strong while the heterosexual preference is weak, such that if
faced with a choice they would reject their heterosexuality. There
is no evidence that this is so. It is highly improbable that a straight
man who is repulsed by homosexual behaviour would find it any
less repugnant if he were propositioned by a gay man. The mere
exposure to a gay person probably does not affect a child’s sexual
orientation, which is most likely established early in life and not
consciously acquired.45
(3) Immutability: The primary aim of legislation is to influence
people’s choices and activities. By making a certain activity a
crime, the legislature hopes to deter persons from engaging in
that activity. The immutability of a trait is relevant because it may
be unfair to inflict legal burdens on persons with a particular
trait if they are not responsible for or have no control over that
trait.46 It also tends to show that legislators, being unable to
become members of the group, are less able to properly identify
with the group’s interests and thus are more likely to be biased by
their own perspectives.47 If the legislature differentiates between
persons on the basis of such immutable traits this may suggest
that it acts in bad faith.48 Furthermore, the immutability of a
Under Penal Code, ss 375-76, the offence of rape is only committed if the
victim is female. Sexual assault on a male victim is only punishable under
ss 377 or 377A. Outraging of modesty is punishable under ss 354 and 354A.
Miller, supra, n 34 at 822.
Ibid at 813.
Ely, supra, n 37 at 160.
Yale LJ, supra, n 34 at 918.
44
45
46
47
48
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trait heightens the group’s stigma since no one would choose to
belong to the group if he or she could help it.49
Immutable traits can be physical (eg skin colour) or relational
(illegitimacy). In addition, Watkins v United States Army held that
a trait so central to a person’s identity that government penalisa-
tion for refusing to alter it would be abhorrent can be considered
as immutable.50 This confirms an indicium of a suspect class
suggested by a commentator51 before the Watkins decision: that
the group’s defining characteristic must be essential to personhood,
ie it must be essential to individual identity, group identity, and
to society’s perception of those identities.
Immutability is not a conclusive sign for a suspect class. Some
established suspect classes (eg alienage) are not immutable, while
some immutable characteristics (eg physical disability and in-
telligence) are accepted as legitimate as means of distinguishing
between persons.52 Besides, immutability only positively elimin-
ates classifications based on traits which are clearly impossible for
individuals to change (such as race), since the government cannot
justify the classification on the ground that it will discourage
people from joining the group.53
The origins and mutability of sexual preference are greatly
Harv L Rev, supra, n 34 at 1302-3.
(1988) 847 F 2d 1329 at 1347 (CA, 9th Cir) (since homosexuals are a suspect
class, Army’s policy of administratively discharging or refusing to re-enlist
them fails strict scrutiny and violates equal protection). When this decision
was reheard en banc in Watkins v United States Army (1989) 875 F 2d 699
the court affirmed the case on grounds of equitable estoppel. However,
Norris J, while concurring with the final decision, agreed with the dissenting
judges that equitable estoppel was inapplicable. Instead he followed his
reasoning in the earlier decision with regard to equal protection.
Harv L Rev, supra, n 34 at 1300.
Yale LJ, supra, n 34 at 918.
Ely, supra, n 37 at 155.
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49
50
51
52
53
disputed.54 Scientists are divided over whether homosexuality
is a result of genetics, a product of early childhood experiences,
a result of the interaction between genetic predisposition and
life experiences, free choice, or a combination of all the factors.
Although one recent study concludes that there may be a difference in
brain structure based on sexual orientation (Simon LeVay, “A Difference in
Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men” (1991)
253 Science 1034), while others posit a genetic difference (eg JM Bailey &
RC Pillard, “A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation” (1991) 48 Arch
Gen Psych 1089; JM Bailey & RC Pillard et al, “Heritable Factors Influence
Sexual Orientation in Women” (1993) 50(3) Arch Gen Psych 217), they have
been criticised on credible grounds. LeVay and Pillard claimed that they found
the INAH3 portion of the hypothalamus to be nearly three times as large
in the brains of heterosexuals than in homosexuals. But the measurement of
brain structure is notoriously difficult and controversial – neuroscientists
disagree on whether the most meaningful gauge is volume (LeVay’s method)
or the number of neurons. Also, homosexual behaviour may determine
brain development instead of the other way round: Joe Dallas, “Born Gay?”
Christianity Today, 22 June 1992 at 20; see also Thomas J Ward & Frederick
A Swarts, “The Mainstreaming of Homosexuality” (1993) 8(10) The World
& I 365 at 369-74. In any case, what is inborn is not necessarily normal,
eg genetic defects and deformities: Dallas, ibid.
The immutability of homosexuality is also challenged by the more than
100 organisations around the world who help people overcome homosexuality.
One such organisation, a Christian ministry called Choices associated with
the Church of Our Saviour, Singapore, was founded by former homosexual
Sinclair Rogers in 1991. The ministry builds upon the Biblical promise of
redemption from homosexuality: “Do not fool yourselves, people who are...
homosexual perverts... – none of these will possess God’s Kingdom.
Some of you were like that. But you have been purified from sin. . . you
have been put right with God by the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit
of our God.”: 1 Cor 6:9-11. In a letter to The Straits Times, 24 December
1992 at 18, Rogers wrote, ”There is growing clinical evidence to indicate
that homosexual tendencies need not be life-controlling. Research by experts
in the field of neuro-psychiatry and psycho-hormonal research makes it clear
that for those who are involved and persevering, homosexual behaviour
can be stopped, and homosexual impulses reduced, and for many, almost
eliminated regardless of any biological influence. [W]hile biology may
indeed influence, it does not pre-programme us into hapless automatons,
devoid of will, conscience or choice.”
16 Sing LR Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation 241
54
But it is not disputed that it is very difficult for a person to
change his sexual orientation. It is therefore suggested that homo-
sexuality, for equal protection purposes, can be treated as an
“immutable” characteristic.
Sexual orientation can also be considered “immutable” because
it is essential to all three aspects of personhood. A gay person’s
sexuality is what makes him perceive himself as different from
others; thus it is a strong feature of his personal identity. Homo-
sexuality is also the marker distinguishing gays as a group from
other groups in society, showing that it is essential to the group’s
identity and to society’s perception of the group.55
(4) Discreteness and Insularity: This indicium arose out of Stone
CJ’s fourth footnote in United States v Carotene Products Co.56
He said:
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied on to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
A discrete and insular minority with views different from the
majority in the legislature and executive lacks the clout needed
to prevent the implementation of legislation and policies which
cause hardship to it. It is politically powerless. Hence the remain-
ing branch of government – the court – has a duty to protect it
by subjecting legislation affecting the minority to strict scrutiny.
Minority here refers to a minority in the political process, not
a minority of the population. For instance, women form about
50% of the population but are under-represented in the political
bodies enacting and enforcing laws, and so form a protected
Harv L Rev, supra, n 34 at 1304-5.
Supra, n 28.
55
56
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class.57 This indicium is not conclusive because it does not on
its own show which minorities should receive protection, making
it easy for any legislative loser to depict itself as a “politically
powerless minority”.
Discreteness and insularity are also relevant because they have
a social component. If the majority has greater social contact
with a minority, this diminishes the hostility that often comes
with unfamiliarity and curbs the majority’s tendency to exaggerate
its superiority. The more we get to know people who are different
in some ways, the more we begin to realise the ways in which they
are the same. This is the beginning of political co-operation.58
But homosexuals are anonymous and diffuse throughout the
population. It is this anonymity that makes them a discrete and
insular minority. Strong prejudice against gays compels most to
remain hidden for fear of losing their reputation and livelihood.
John Hart Ely feels that it is this combination of prejudice and
lack of visible outward signs of homosexuality that makes it
a suspect class, because it diminishes the likelihood that the
majority’s hostility against gays will be neutralised by greater
social contact.59
In any case, Ely points out that political access is important
but cannot alone protect a group against hostility nor correct the
unfair biases of the majority. Even if minorities gain a political
voice, prejudices can always survive and even be exacerbated;
other groups may refuse to deal with the minority; or the minority
may simply be consistently outvoted in the democratic process.60
Therefore even if a group attains an “appropriate” share of polit-
ical power, strict scrutiny is still necessary if prejudice against
them persists.
Miller, supra, n 34 at 815.
Ely, supra, n 37 at 161.
Ibid at 163.
Ibid at 161.
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2. Proof of Discrimination
Once a group is established to be a suspect class, to prove discrim-
ination it must be shown that (1) the law has a disproportionate
impact on the suspect class; and (2) the legislature, in enact-
ing the impugned provision, acted with discriminatory intent.61
Discriminatory intent must be proved by direct and not just
circumstantial evidence. The legislative or administrative history
of a law or policy, especially contemporaneous statements by
officials, minutes of meetings, reports and testimony as to the
motivation behind the decision are direct evidence of discrimina-
tion. On the other hand, the historical background of a decision
(especially if revealed in a series of purposefully discriminatory
actions), the specific sequence of events preceding the challenged
law or policy, and departures from normal procedures or sub-
stantive criteria are only circumstantial evidence.62 In effect, what
a plaintiff must do is to show that the legislature intended to
discriminate against him or her. It is not enough to show the
discrimination was just a foreseeable side-effect of the provision.
Such a high standard of proof is required because strict scrutiny
almost always leads to invalidation of the law under review, so
frequent use of it is disruptive to the government trying to achieve
its objectives. Secondly, it is members of the legislature, not the
judiciary, who are the elected representatives of the people, so
the court must guard against excessive judicial interference with
legislative action. Thirdly, a low standard of proof might undesir-
ably cause the legislature to unconsciously treat suspect classes
differently where laws and policies are laid down, thus perpetuating
their sense of separateness and isolation.63
Washington v Davis (1976) 426 US 229 at 242-45.
Village of Arlington Heights v Metropolitan Hous Dev Corp (1977) 429
US 252 at 267-68.
Yale LJ, supra, n 34 at 923-24.
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C. The New Standard: Intermediate Review64
The rigid two-tier system of equal protection is not completely
satisfactory as it excludes groups which are discriminated against
on grounds other than race and alienage. This has led the United
States Supreme Court to develop intermediate scrutiny,65 a stand-
ard not as stringent as a “compelling interest” but involving far
less deference to the legislature than rational review.
Intermediate review requires that the classification used need
only be “substantially related” to the achievement of “import-
ant governmental objectives”.66 The court looks more closely at
the ends and means of the challenged statute instead of merely
pronouncing it valid or invalid under traditional analysis.67 The
court will not accept as legitimate every objective of the statute
advanced by the government, and if the objective can be achieved
through alternative means which do not disadvantage the quasi-
suspect class, the court will prompt the legislature to use these
alternative means by invalidating the legislation.
1. Indicia for a Quasi-Suspect Class
Intermediate scrutiny is closely related to strict scrutiny. A group
qualifies as a quasi-suspect class if it shares at least some of
the indicia for suspectness. Another non-conclusive factor is the
presence of a significant overlap between the group in question
and other classes which have been established by the courts as
suspect.68 Discrimination based on gender and illegitimacy have
been identified as warranting intermediate scrutiny in the United
States.
Nowak & Rotunda, supra, n 4 at 576-77 § 14.3.
Craig v Boren (1976) 429 US 190 at 210-11.
Ibid at 197.
Plyler v Doe, supra, n 32 at 218 n 16.
Yale LJ, supra, n 34 at 916, 919.
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Members of quasi-suspect groups justify only intermediate
review because they suffer less societal prejudice than fully-suspect
classes.69 Neither do they completely lack political power. While
women may be discriminated against in some ways, they constitute
roughly 50% of voters and so possess a measure of political
power. Similarly, illegitimate children grow up into voting adults.
Futhermore, it is sometimes necessary for the government to use
quasi-suspect classifications to distinguish between persons: for
example, statutes treating women differently from men may be
justified because it may be inappropriate for women to perform
some tasks that men perform, such as combat.70
Intermediate scrutiny is relevant to homosexual conduct, for it
may be appropriate to allow discrimination against homosexuals
on some grounds but not on others.
2. Proof of Discrimination
The standard of proof for discriminatory intent developed in cases
involving suspect classes also applies to claims by quasi-suspect
classes. Therefore mere evidence of a disproportionate impact on a
quasi-suspect class which is a natural and foreseeable consequence
of a given action is insufficient to establish a discriminatory
purpose.71 However one commentator has suggested that such a
high standard of proof is not required for quasi-suspect classes
because many more laws can withstand intermediate review than
strict scrutiny, so intermediate review is unlikely to lead to wide-
spread invalidation of laws and the paralysis of the legislature.
The judiciary is thus unlikely to be blamed for trespassing into
the legislature’s domain. Since legislators can relatively easily tailor
Eg Mathews v Lucas (1976) 427 US 495 at 505-6 (illegitimate children
suffer less prejudice than racial minorites and women).
Pettinga, supra, n 4 at 184 n 58.
Personnel Administrator v Feeney (1979) 442 US 256 at 271-74, 278-79.
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statutes to bear a fair and substantial relation to an important
governmental goal, undue consciousness of disfavoured classifi-
cations is unlikely to occur.
Under this “new model” proof of discriminatory intent, once
members of a quasi-suspect class can prove disproportionate
impact, they establish prima facie equal protection violation by
adducing only circumstantial evidence of intent such as evidence
that the impact is foreseeable, severe and uniformly persistent
over a period of time. The burden then shifts to the government
to show that it acted without discriminatory intent or that the
law is well-designed to serve other important goals.72
D. Heightened Scrutiny Applied to Homosexuals73
The United States Supreme Court has yet to pronounce whether
anti-sodomy statutes violate equal protection. But in Baker v
Wade,74 the Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held that homo-
sexuals are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and applied
rational review to a Texas statute criminalising homosexual sodomy.
It reached this conclusion because no cases were cited to show that
homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, and by
applying Doe v Commonwealth’s Attorney,75 a binding Supreme
Court decision which apparently decided that engaging in homo-
sexual conduct is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Baker went on to find that the statute bore a rational relation
to the state’s goal of implementing morality, given the strong
objections to homosexual conduct that had historically prevailed
See Yale LJ above, n 34 at 922, 924, 927.
John Charles Hayes, “The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of
Equality: Homosexuality and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After
Bowers v Hardwick” (1990) 31 Boston Coll LR 375.
(1985) 769 F 2d 289.
(1976) 425 US 901.
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in Western culture. In denying a petition for a rehearing,76 the
court again rejected an equal protection claim, reasoning that
the statute proscribed conduct, not a class, and that those who
engaged in the conduct did so by choice. The government could
legitimately decide that certain forms of conduct are wrong, and
it was not for the courts to resolve moral questions.
It is submitted that Baker should not be followed. Instead of
determining if homosexuals are a suspect class by applying the
indicia laid down by the Supreme Court, the court relied on Doe.
Doe was a summary affirmation of a district court decision by
the Supreme Court. No opinion was rendered. The Supreme Court
itself has ruled that a summary affirmation is of less value as a
precedent than a decision on the merits of a case.77 In Hardwick
v Bowers78 Johnson J writing for the majority stated that the
summary affirmation of Doe was not binding precedent and not
conclusive in settling the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws.
It is also unclear from a summary affirmation whether a higher
court means to approve of only the decision of a lower court, or
its reasoning also.79 Furthermore, although anti-sodomy laws
criminalise conduct and not homosexuals as a class, they have a
disproportionate impact on homosexuals.80 And it is arguable
that anti-sodomy laws do not stand up even to rational review
because their objectives are inherently obnoxious.
(1985) 774 F 2d 1285; certificate for appeal refused (1986) 478 US 1022,
478 US 1035.
Edelman v Jordan (1974) 415 US 651 at 671.
(1985) 760 F 2d 1202 at 1207-8 (CA, 11th Cir). Although reversed by Bowers
v Hardwick, supra, n 30, the Supreme Court stated that it did not have to
resolve the Doe dispute, preferring to give plenary consideration to the
merits of Bowers rather than rely on Doe.
Mark John Kappelhoff, “Bowers v Hardwick: Is There a Right to Privacy?”
(1988) 37 Amer Univ LR 487 at 502 n 115.
On disproportionate impact, supra, n 61 and the accompanying text.
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In decisions involving employment discrimination against
homosexuals, some courts have held that homosexuals constitute
a protected class81 while others have not.82 The reason for this
divergence is that the latter line of cases hold that the Supreme
Court’s refusal in Bowers v Hardwick83 to recognise a due pro-
cess privacy right to engage in homosexual conduct prevents the
granting of protected class status to homosexuals under equal pro-
tection doctrine, since to do so would undermine Hardv/ick. But
Hardwick has been severely criticized84 as being out of line with
other Supreme Court decisions developing the right to privacy.85
Also, Hardwick was based purely on due process doctrine, the
Supreme Court expressly stating that its conclusion did not deal
with equal protection principles.86 Therefore the case does not
prevent a plaintiff from challenging statutes on equal protection
High Tech Gays v Defense Industry Security Clearance Office (1987) 668 F
Supp 1361 (considers homosexuals a quasi-suspect class, though giving no
reasons why it is not a fully-suspect class); Watkins v United States Army
(1988) 847 F 2d 1329 (CA, 9th Cir) (considers homosexuals a fully-suspect
class).
Eg Padula v Webster (1987) 822 F 2d 97 (CA, DC Cir); Woodward v
United States (1989) 871 F 2d 1068 (CA, Fed Cir); Ben-Shalom v Marsh
(1989) 881 F 2d 454 (CA, 7th Cir).
Supra, n 30.
Eg Kappelhoff, supra, n 79; Laurence H Tribe, American Constitutional
Law (2nd ed, 1988) at 1423 § 15-21; Cf Alan J Wertjes, “Behind the Facade:
Understanding the Potential Extension of the Constitutional Right to Privacy
to Homosexual Conduct” (1986) 64 Wash U LQ 1233.
Notably Criswold v Connecticut (1965) 381 US 479 (law prohibiting use of
contraceptives by married couples infringes constitutional right to privacy);
Stanley v Georgia (1969) 393 US 557 (law prohibiting private possession
of pornographic materials unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) 405
US 438 (constitutional right to privacy extends to contraceptive use by
unmarried persons); Roe v Wade (1973) 415 US 113 (constitutional right to
privacy includes right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy).
Hardwick at 198 n 8.
81
82
83
84
85
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grounds. There is no reason why a statute cannot violate one
Article of the Constitution while not affecting another. It has been
suggested that due process doctrine protects only traditional prac-
tices and conventions from attack by political majorities in power,
whereas equal protection protects disadvantaged groups from
discriminatory legislation and policies even if deeply-ingrained
and traditional.87 In any case Hardwick is not binding on Singa-
pore courts.
II. HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY IN
SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA
Local academics, citing Indian and American cases, suggest that
in Singapore and Malaysia there exist “forbidden classifications”
on which no legislation may be based, even if the rational nexus
test is satisfied.88 Forbidden classifications are in fact suspect
classifications under the doctrine of strict scrutiny.89 Unlike the
United States, certain forbidden classifications are explicitly stated
in the constitutions of India, Malaysia and Singapore. To invalidate
legislation based on such classifications it is only necessary to
cite the appropriate Article. In Singapore, Art 12(2) lists religion,
race, descent and place of birth90 as characteristics which cannot
Cass R Sunstein, “Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on
the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection” (1988) 55
U Chicago LR 1161, especially at 1163; Hayes, supra, n 73 at 468-69. This
was applied by Watkins v United States Army at 1340, 1349, 1352. Cf
Laurence H Tribe & Michael C Dorf, On Reading the Constitution (1991)
at 115-16, disagreeing with Sunstein.
Huang Su Mien, supra, n 6 at 138-63 Ch VI (“Forbidden classifications”);
Tan, Yeo & Lee, supra, n 4 at 615.
Eg Tribe, supra, n 84 at 1466 § 16-14, treats forbidden classifications as
suspect classifications.
Gender or sex is a notable omission from this list; cf Indian Constitution
Arts 15 and 16. In 1963, Hickling wrote, “[T]he absence of that short and
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form the basis of classification for legislation, appointment to
any office, public employment, the administration of property, or
the establishment or carrying on of any trade, business, profession,
vocation or employment. Article 16(1) states that Singapore citizens
cannot be discriminated against on these same grounds in respect
of education.
Since sexual orientation is not one of the categories in Art 12(2),
classifications based on it are not expressly forbidden in Singapore.
But the categories of forbidden classifications are not closed by
this list of prohibited criteria.91 It is always open to the court to
discover new suspect classifications under Art 12(1). Although
Art 12(2) says that there shall be no discrimination “on the grounds
only” of religion, race, descent or place of birth, the word only
cannot mean that all the possible forbidden classifications are
listed in Art 12(2) and that there are no others.92 Such a view
dreadful word, ‘sex’, from Article 8 of the Constitution is probably regarded
as sufficient to keep the male sex dominant in the Federation, at least in
the field of civil service.”: RH Hickling, “Some Aspects of Fundamental
Liberties under the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia” (1963)
29 MLJ xliv at xlix. This foreshadowed the recent controversy over equal
rights for women civil servants. At present the spouses and dependent
children of male civil servants obtain medical benefits, while those of female
civil servants do not. The Minister of Finance Dr Richard Hu informed
Parliament that the government was sticking to the status quo because of
the principle that the husband is head of the household in Asian societies.
“It is the husband’s responsibility to look after the family’s needs, including
their medical needs. This is how our society is structured. It would be
unwise to tamper with this structure”: The Straits Times, 12 November 1993
at 26. This provoked reactions from journalists, politicians, civil servants
and groups such as the Singapore Council of Women’s Organisations
(SCWO) and the Association of Women for Action and Research (AWARE):
The Straits Times, 17 November 1993 at 29, 19 November 1993 at 37,
25 November 1993 at 30, 27 November 1993 at 35, 29 November 1993 at 27,
4 December 1993 at 27, 12 December 1993 at 2, 22 August 1994 at 1, 24.
Huang Su Mien, supra, n 6 at 140.
Authorities suggest that the phrase on the grounds only has two possible
91
92
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derogates from the breadth of Art 12(1) and is inconsistent with
the approach to constitutional interpretation in Ong Ah Chuan
v PP, that Part IV of the Constitution should be given “a generous
interpretation, avoiding what has been called ‘the austerity of
tabulated legalism’, suitable to give to individuals the full measure
of the [fundamental liberties] referred to.”93 Instead, Art 12(2)
should be seen as a specific application of the general principle
laid down in Art 12(1), a legislative attempt to outlaw classifica-
tions which it finds particularly insidious. It is submitted that
the presence of forbidden classifications in Art 12(2) coupled
with the general right of equal protection in Art 12(1) suggests
that heightened scrutiny applies in Singapore.
The applicability of strict scrutiny in Malaysia was affirmed
by Malaysian Bar v Government of Malaysia.94 In that case,
s 46A(1)(a) of the Malaysian Legal Profession Act 1976 restricted
membership of the Bar Council, State Bar Committee and any
committees of the Bar Council and Bar Committee to advocates
and solicitors of not less than seven years’ standing. Among other
interpretations: (1) it could mean that the prohibited ground should not be
the sole consideration for discriminatory treatment: PP v Datuk Harun bin
Haji Idris [1976] 2 MLJ 116 at 119 col 1E (HC, Kuala Lumpur): “The use
of the word ‘only’ in Art 8(2) connotes that what is discountenanced is
discrimination purely and solely on account of all or any one or more of
the grounds mentioned in the clause. A discrimination based on any of these
grounds and also on other grounds is not affected by Art 8(2) though it
may be hit by Art 8(1)”; see also Huang Su Mien, supra, n 6 at 138-63;
Singh, supra, n 4 at 73-74; (2) it could also mean that the effect of a
statute and not its purpose or motive is the determining factor: State of
Bombay v Bombay Education Society [1954] AIR SC 561 (interpreting a
similar phrase in Art 29(2) of the Indian Constitution); Yusuf Abdul Aziz
v State of Bombay [1954] AIR SC 321; see Singh, ibid. No case has ever
interpreted the phrase as limiting the concept of equal protection to only
the forbidden classifications explicitly stated in the Constitution.
Supra, n 13 at 70 cols 2C-E.
[1987] 2 MLJ 165 (SC, Malaysia).
252 Singapore Law Review (1995)
93
94
things, this provision was alleged to violate the equal protection
clause of Art 8(1) (Singapore’s Art 12(1)) by denying lawyers of
less than seven years’ standing representation in the governing
bodies of the profession. Counsel for the Malaysian Bar urged
the court to adopt strict scrutiny instead of rational review to the
provision. Although the Malaysian Bar’s appeal ultimately failed,
both the majority and dissenting judges in the case accepted the
application of strict scrutiny in Malaysia.
We deal first with the dissenting decision of Lord President
Salleh Abas. After an investigation into the development of strict
scrutiny in the United States, he concluded:
The general principle culled from the authorities and judicially
determined, succinctly put, is that Article 8(1) permits reasonable
classification founded on intelligible differentia having a rational
relation or nexus with the policy or object sought to be achieved
by the statute or statutory provision in question. . . . If however
the court determines that the challenged statutory classification
affects a fundamental right or is drawn on the basis of suspect
criteria, then a mere rational connection between the selected
legislative goal and the enacted legislative differentiation will not
suffice per se, and in such a case a stricter scrutiny and a higher
degree of precision than ordinarily required will be necessary.
But he commented: “In reality the treatment of suspect classifica-
tion does not differ much from the traditional test as both are
primarily concerned with the question of whether or not there
is a reasonable basis for the classification.”95
The majority judgment was given by Mohamed Azmi SCJ, with
whom Wan Hamzah SCJ agreed. In his view, the classification
satisfied the rational nexus test, and even the “legitimate or com-
pelling state or governmental interest” test required in the United
States,96 ie the strict scrutiny test. However, he mentioned that:
Ibid at 168 cols 1H-2C (emphasis added).
Ibid at 171 col 1G, 172 col 2H.
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there is no question of discarding the traditional or simple
approach in favour of the suspect classification, for in reality
both are primarily concerned with the question of whether or not
there is a reasonable or permissible basis for the classification,
and that for such determination the court must review the real
object of the legislation.97
The highest court in Malaysia has thus recognised that greater
scrutiny is justified when legislation unfairly burdens a suspect
class. However it is respectfully submitted that the court mis-
applied the doctrine. While it correctly identified that in both
rational and strict scrutiny there exists a nexus between the classi-
fication and the object of the legislation, it erred in arguing that
there is really only one standard of review. This fails to recognise
that courts perform quite different functions when they virtually
prohibit governmental use of classifications in strict scrutiny,
examine the legitimacy of classifications under intermediate review,
and presume the constitutionality of classifications under rational
review.98
Neither does strict scrutiny replace rational review, as Mohamed
Azmi and Wan Hamzah SCJJ seemed to believe. Few groups are
likely to qualify for suspect class status. In fact, the attempt by
counsel for the Malaysian Bar to elevate lawyers of less than seven
years’ standing to a suspect class rightly failed. Less-experienced
lawyers do not constitute a suspect class since experience in
the legal profession does not satisfy the required indicia.99 The
section clearly did not trigger strict scrutiny at all. Mohamed
Azmi SCJ applied strict scrutiny incorrectly when he stated that
the impugned section satisfied the “legitimate or compelling state
or governmental interest” test.
Ibid at 171 cols 1B-D.
Nowak & Rotunda, supra, n 4 at 574 § 14.3.
Supra, nn 34-60 and the accompanying text.
97
98
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Nevertheless it is submitted that the doctrine’s misapplication
does not undermine its acceptance in Malaysia. This is rein-
forced by a subsequent decision, Government of Malaysia v
VR Menon,100 in which five judges of the Supreme Court of
Malaysia implied that a stricter standard of review is appropriate
in cases involving fundamental rights. While they did not ex-
pressly mention if strict review is also applicable to suspect-class
discrimination, the court felt that the Malaysian Bar case “set
out the correct approach in determining permissible legislative
classification in relation to the equality provision of art 8(1).”101
On the basis of these cases, it is submitted the doctrine of strict
scrutiny applies in Singapore. Since the doctrine of intermediate
review is a modification of strict scrutiny in appropriate cases,
by the same token it should be considered part of Singapore and
Malaysian law.
There are also policy reasons for applying strict and inter-
mediate scrutiny in the local context. For a start, our Constitution
ensures that minorities have neither less nor more rights than
the majority.102 If minorities suffer social isolation and prejudice,
they may feel deterred or even be prevented from participating in
the political process, eg by standing for election, and so may be
less able to persuade the majority to treat them fairly. The court
thus has a constitutional responsibility to carefully scrutinise
legislation passed by the majority which impinges on minority
interests.103 Legislation that unfairly restricts these interests is
entitled to substantially less deference than other legislation.104
[1990] 1 MLJ 277 at 279 col 21-280 col 1A.
Ibid at 279 col 1E.
Supra, n 2.
Craig R Ducat & Harold W Chase, Constitutional Interpretation (5th ed,
1992) at 93.
United States v Carolene Products Co, supra, n 28.
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Secondly, heightened scrutiny reinforces the notion of funda-
mental liberties. If some rights are established as fundamental
by the Constitution, it stands to reason that everyone is entitled
to these rights before claims to non-fundamental rights can be
granted. Therefore in any conflict between persons attempting to
have their fundamental liberties recognised and others claiming
less important rights, fundamental liberties must prevail even if
the number of people claiming them is significantly less.105
Finally, heightened scrutiny ensures that while the government
has the power to make distinctions in the way it treats people,
where fundamental rights or protected classes are involved it
must not do so for reasons that have no convincing relationship
to the issue sought to be dealt with by statute.106 Intermediate
scrutiny is useful where the government should be allowed to
discriminate against a class of persons for certain purposes but
not for others. In general, heightened scrutiny reminds lawmakers
to be cautious of their own purposes and assumptions, and the
effects of their choices.107
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF
SECTIONS 377 AND 377A OF THE PENAL CODE108
A statutory provision violates heightened standards of equal
protection if the motivation behind its enactment is to intentionally
discriminate against a suspect class. This must be proved by direct
evidence of the provision’s legislative history. As an example of
how equal protection doctrine might operate, we now consider
the constitutionality of ss 377 and 377A of the Penal Code. These
Supra, n 103 at 95.
Ibid.
Tribe, supra, n 84 at 1451 § 16-6.
Chapter 224, 1985 Rev Ed.
105
106
107
108
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sections appear in Chapter XVI of the Penal Code and are termed
“unnatural offences”. The phrase “anti-sodomy provisions” will
be used as a shorthand to refer to the offences collectively. The
Oxford English Dictionary109 explains sodomy as “an unnatural
form of sexual intercourse, esp that of one male with another.”
Thus the word technically has a wide meaning, although it is
often loosely applied to anal intercourse only.
A. Section 377
1. Legislative History
For centuries sodomy was a capital offence in England.110 Origin-
ally, only ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over the offence
as it was based on Biblical proscriptions of the practice.111 In the
past it appears that the offence included both lesbianism and
2nd ed, 1989.
See Wayne C Bartee & Alice Fleetwood Bartee, Litigating Morality: Amer-
ican Legal Thought and its English Roots (1992) at 31-36.
The Christian Church’s teaching on homosexuality is based on God’s
original plan for mankind: God commanded Adam and Eve to “be fruitful
and multiply” by means of sexual procreation (Gen 1:28). Thus sexual in-
tercourse without a lifelong commitment (fornication or adultery) or
between two men or two women even if in a lifelong commitment is
outside God’s will. “If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of
them have committed an abomination; they shall be put to death, their
blood is upon them.”: Lev 20:13. In New Testament times, Jesus Christ
upheld Old Testament law (Mt 5:17-19) and affirmed that only sexuality
in a heterosexual context between a married couple is legitimate; celibacy
is the only legitimate alternative to marriage: Mt 19:12. The sinfulness
of homosexuality was maintained in early Christian teaching: “Even the
women pervert the natural use of their sex by unnatural acts. In the same
way the men give up natural sexual relations with women and burn with
passion for each other. Men do shameful things with each other, and as
a result they bring upon themselves the punishment they deserve for their
wrongdoing.’: Rom 1:26-27. See Bob Davies, “What the Bible Says About
Homosexuality” (1993) Discipleship Journal, issue 73, at 26.
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male homosexuality, for in the 13th century a treatise called Fleta,
compiled by several English judges, identified and described the
crime of sodomy simply as intercourse with a person of one’s
own gender, or with animals. Britton, a legal treatise of the 14th
century, was an almost verbatim translation. Michael Dalton’s
The Countrey Justice (1618) included in the offence sexual acts
involving only women. However, later descriptions of the offence
specifically excluded lesbian acts. Sir Edward Coke’s influential
restatement of English law in his Institutes (1648) says that the
offence was committed “by mankind with mankind, or with brute
beast, or by womankind with brute beast.”112
This was the interpretation placed on the statute 25 Hen VIII
c 6 (1533), which first made sodomy an offence triable by ordinary
criminal courts. The offence, described as “the detestable and
abominable vice of buggery committed with mankind or beast”,
was modified and repealed but later revived by 5 Eliz c 17. The
offence was finally incorporated into the Offences Against the
Person Act 1829 (9 Geo IV c 31),113 and now exists as s 12 of
the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (c 69). 114
Section 377 of our Penal Code was enacted as part of the
Straits Settlements Penal Code by Ordinance No 4 of 1871, which
was derived from the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).
It came into force on 16 September 1872. 115 Whitley Stokes said
Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England:
Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the Crown and Criminall
Causes (2nd ed, 1648) at 58, reprinted in the Appendix to this article.
Section XV reads: “And it be enacted, That every Person convicted of the
abominable Crime of Buggery, committed either with Mankind or with
every Animal, shall suffer Death as a Felon.”
Homosexual acts between consenting males above 21 were decriminalised
by s 1(1) of the UK Sexual Offences Act 1967 (c 60). The age of consent
was recently lowered to 18 by s 145 of the UK Criminal Justice and Public
Order Act 1994 (c 33).
See Andrew Phang Boon Leong, “Of Codes and Ideology: Some Notes
258 Singapore Law Review (1995)
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the Indian Penal Code was “based on the law of England, stript
of technicality and local peculiarities, shortened, simplified, made
intelligible and precise; but suggestions were derived from the
French Code Penal and from Livingston’s Code of Louisiana.”116
Although the main drafter of the Indian Code, Lord Macaulay,
denied that he had consciously relied on English criminal law
he was certainly influenced by it. Doubtless he considered the
Offences Against the Person Act 1826, but instead of following
this he used the form of indictment prescribed by English law
for sodomy cases: “contra natura ordirum habiut veneream et
Carnaliter cognovit” (carnal intercourse against the order of
nature).117
Section 377 was probably included in the Indian Penal Code
because sodomy was viewed as immoral. Lord Macaulay was
reluctant to articulate the reasons for its inclusion:
[The clauses dealing with rape and unnatural offences] relate
to an odious class of offences respecting which it is desirable
that as little as possible should be said. . . . We are unwilling
to insert, either in the text or in the notes, any thing which
could give rise to public discussion on this revolting subject;
as we are decidedly of opinion that the injury which would be
done to the morals of the community by such discussion would
far more than compensate for any benefits which might be
derived from legislative measures framed with the greatest
precision.118
on the Origins of the Major Criminal Enactments of Singapore” (1989)
31 Mal LR 46-63; and KL Koh, CMV Clarkson & NA Morgan, Criminal
Law in Singapore and Malaysia (1989) at 4-5 for a detailed discussion of
the Penal Code’s introduction into Singapore.
The Anglo-Indian Codes (Whitley Stokes ed, 1887) at 71, cited in Andrew
Phang, ibid.
Government v Bapoji Bhatt (1884) 7 Mysore LR 280 at 281-82. The words
of the indictment are also cited by Coke, supra, n 112 at 59.
“Introductory Report Upon the Indian Penal Code: From: TB Macaulay,
116
117
118
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This did not deter Kennedy ACJ in Khanu v Emperor119  from
freely speculating that unnatural offences were still punishable
in modern nations:
Partly I suppose because of the desire of princes to encourage
legitimate marriage. Partly because there is an idea, (perhaps
erroneous) that the public or tolerated practice of that vice
creates a tendency in the citizens of the State, where it is prac-
tised, to adopt an unmanly and morbid method of life and
thinking, so that a person saturated with those ideas is a less
useful member of society, partly because of the danger that
men put in authority over other men may use their power for
the gratification of their lusts, but principally I suppose because
of the danger to young persons, lest they be indoctrinated into
sexual matters prematurely.
Apart from the point on child abuse, the other rationalisations
are doubtful. It is questionable whether any of them justify the
existence of s 377 today.
2. Interpretation and Scope 120
377. Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the
order of nature with any man, woman or animals, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable
to fine.
Explanation. – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the
JM Macleod, GW Anderson, F Millett: Indian Law Commission to:
Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India in Council, Dated 14 October
1837” in The Works of Lord Macaulay, Speeches – Poems and Mis-
cellaneous (Albany ed, 1837) vol XI note (M) at 144.
[1925] AIR Sind 286 at 286-87.
See generally, HS Gour, Penal Law of India (10th ed, 1987) vol IV at
3259-62; and Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes (23rd ed, 1991) vol II
at 1417-21.
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carnal intercourse necessary to the offence described in the
section.
Indian commentators rely heavily on English authorities to inter-
pret s 377. Whether it is correct to do so is beyond the scope
of this article.121 Since the section has not changed materially
since it was enacted in Singapore,122 Indian cases can be applied
to interpret it.
(1) Actus Reus: The actus reus of the offence is the commission
of carnal intercourse against the order of nature, which is not
defined in the Penal Code.123
Many commentators have condemned the use of English criminal law to
interpret the Penal Code; for instance, V Balasubrahmanyam, “The Guilty
Mind” in Essays on the Indian Penal Code (1962): “It is a tragedy that
some times the Indian Penal Code is called upon to bear the oppressive
weight of English case law.” Cf Stanley Yeo Meng Heong, “The Application
of Common Law Defences to the Penal Code in Singapore and Malaysia”
in The Common Law in Singapore and Malaysia (AJ Harding ed, 1985)
at 145-46: “Common law principles may assist in the application of this
rule of interpretation, provided always that those principles are generally
consistent with the statutory provisions concerned.”
Section 377 was amended by s 11 of the Penal Code Amendment Ordinance
1872 (No 3 of 1872) so that for every second or subsequent offence the
punishment was whipping. By s 13 of the Amendment Ordinance this
change was to be “taken and read as part of the Penal Code, and shall
come into operation at the same time as the Penal Code.” The section was
again amended by s 16 of Ordinance No 35 of 1933 to read: “. . . punished
with penal servitude for life, or with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall also be liable to fine
or to whipping.” Finally, the Criminal Justice (Punishment – Amendment)
Ordinance 1954 (No 20 of 1954) abolished penal servitude and deleted
the words “or to whipping” from the section.
Contrast the new s 377A of the Malaysian Penal Code, inserted by the
Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A727 of 1989), which defines
carnal intercourse against the order of nature as “sexual connection with
another person by the introduction of the penis into the anus or mouth
of the other person”.
123
122
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(a) Anal Intercourse (coitus per anum, buggery, “sodomy”,
“sin of Sodom”): From early times, anal intercourse was punish-
able in England as the offence of buggery, defined as sexual
intercourse per anum by a man with another man or with
a woman.124 It seems incontrovertible that anal intercourse
also constitutes carnal intercourse against the order of nature.
The Singapore Court of Criminal Appeal in M Kanagasun-
tharam v PP accepted without discussion that the sexual act
falls within s 377.125
(b) Fellatio (coitus per os, “sin of Gomorrah”): There is more
controversy where this sexual act is concerned. Two divergent
lines of authority exist. In England fellatio is not considered
buggery,126 and this was applied obiter dicta to s 377 in Ma-
dras by Re Govindarajulu Naicken.127 In Government v Bapoji
Bhatt128 Plumer CJ came to the same conclusion, reasoning
that since s 377 was clearly drafted along the same lines as
the English law of sodomy, the ingredients of the offence were
precisely the same.
On the other hand, the court in Sirkar v Gula Mythien Pillai
Ch Ithu Mahomathul29 felt it unnecessary to refer to English
R v Wiseman (1718) Fortes Rep 91, 92 ER 774; R v Reekspear (1832)
1 Mood CC 342, 168 ER 1296; R v Barron [1914] 2 KB 570 at 576, 10
Cr App Rep 81 at 89 (CCA). (Buggery also encompasses sexual intercourse
per anum or per vaginam by a man or a woman with an animal: R v
Cozins (1834) 6 C & P 351, 172 ER 1272; R v Brown (1889) 24 QBD 357
(CCA); R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App Rep 125 (CCA).)
[1992] 1 SLR 81. See also PP v Jumahat, Criminal Case No 9/1992,
14 August 1992 (HC) (referred to in the case as “sodomy”).
R v Jacobs (1817) Russ & Ry 331, 168 ER 830.
(1886) 1 Weir 382.
Supra, n 117 at 281-82.
(1908) 14(3) Travancore LR (appendix) 43 at 45.
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law, instead holding that “the words used in the Penal Code
are very simple and wide enough to include all acts against
the order of nature. It would be contrary to reason to hold
on the language of the Code that sodomy in its strict sense is
punishable, but not an offence which is much more abominable
and against the order of nature.” In Khanu130 Kennedy AJC
said: “[T]here is no intercourse unless the visiting member is
enveloped at least partially by the visited organism, for inter-
course connotes reciprocity. Looking at the question in this
way it would seem that the sin of Gomorrah is no less carnal
intercourse, than the sin of Sodom.” Khanu was applied in
Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v The State131 where Sheth J com-
mented, “[T]he orifice of the mouth is not, according to nature,
meant for sexual or carnal intercourse. Viewing from that
aspect, it could be said that this act of putting a male organ
into the mouth of the victim for the purposes of satisfying his
sexual appetite, would be an act of carnal intercourse against
the order of nature.” This reading is supported by the wording
of s 377 which is wider than the English offence of buggery.
Had Lord Macaulay intended the Indian and English offences
to be identical, why did he not follow the wording of the Eng-
lish offence?
The Singapore position is no clearer. It was assumed without
discussion in Kanagasuntharam132 that fellatio is punishable
under s 377. When the issue was specifically raised before
the High Court in the recent decision, PP v Victor Rajoo
s/o A Pitchay Muthu,133 the same conclusion was reached.
However, less than a month later, the High Court held in PP
Supra, n 119.
[1968] AIR Guj 252 at 254.
Supra, n 125.
Criminal Case No 39 of 1995, 7 August 1995 (HC).
130
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v Tan Kuan Meng134 that fellatio does not constitute carnal
intercourse against the order of nature if it is engaged in be-
tween consenting adults as a “prelude to natural sex” and not
performed as a substitute for natural or consensual sex.135
(c) Other Sexual Acts: The scope of s 377 is limited by certain
unwritten assumptions which are not warranted on a plain
and ordinary reading of the provision. For instance, although
the Explanation to s 377 merely states that penetration is suf-
ficient to constitute carnal intercourse, Indian authorities take
it for granted that penetration is a necessary element of the
offence,136 although seminal discharge need not be proved.137
This apparently results from the application of the common
law to the Indian Penal Code. According to Coke: “[T]here
must be penetratio, that is, res in re, either with mankind,
or with beast, but the least penetration maketh it carnall inter-
course.”138 This was later embodied in s 17 of the UK Offences
Against the Person Act 1828, from which the s 377 Explanation
was probably taken:
‘And Whereas upon Trials for. . . Buggery. . . Offenders
frequently escape by reason of the Difficulty of the Proof
which has been required of the Completion of those several
crimes;’ for Remedy thereof be it enacted, That it shall not
“Justice Lai Clarifies When Oral Sex is Not an Offence”, The Straits
Times, 30 August 1995 at 3.
Regrettably, the full decision was unavailable at the time of printing and
the point is not entirely clear from the sketchy newspaper report. When
defence counsel queried whether oral sex between two consenting adults
who did not proceed to have natural sex was an offence, Lai J replied,
“What is wrong with that?” but later qualified himself by saying, “Let’s
cross the bridge when we come to it.”
Gour, supra, n 120 at 3262; Ratanlal & Dhirajlal, supra, n 120 at 1418.
Lohana Vasantlal Devchand, supra, n 131.
Coke, supra, n 112.
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be necessary, in any of those Cases, to prove the actual
Emission of Seed in order to constitute a carnal knowledge,
but that the carnal knowledge shall be deemed complete
upon Proof of Penetration only.139
Furthermore, the cases imply that penetration must be by
the penis and not other parts of the body. The upshot of these
assumptions is that sexual acts other than those described above
such as cunnilingus and mutual masturbation are not s 377
offences. Although “penetration” was given an uncomfortably
broad reading in State of Kerala v Kundumkara Govindan,140
where “insertion” or “thrusting” of the penis between the thighs
of a female was considered sufficient to constitute an unnatural
offence, the case was rejected by the Singapore High Court in
Victor Rajoo.141
The implied limitations on the scope of s 377 also mean that
lesbian behaviour is excluded from the section.142 In Khanu,
This provision was applied by R v Reekspear (1832) 1 Mood CC 342,
168 ER 1296. See also Coke, ibid at 59: “Emissio seminis maketh it not
Buggery, but is an evidence in the case of buggery of penetration: and so
in Rape the words be also carnaliter cognovit [carnal knowledge], and
therefore there must be penetration; and emissio seminis without penetration
maketh no rape.”
(1969) Crim LJ 818.
Supra, n 133.
See KL Koh, Criminal Law (1977) at 72: “[L]esbianism is not an offence.”
It is said that the drafters of the Penal Code in consultation with Queen
Victoria excluded the possibility of covering lesbian sexual acts since
Queen Victoria could not possibly envisage that such acts could actually
take place: Wilfred Ong, “Decriminalising Homosexuality” (1993) 11
Commentary 114 at 114. Contrast the position under the Malaysian Penal
Code (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A727 of 1989), which renumbered s 377A
as s 377D and deleted all references to males. The effect is that a woman
found engaging in lesbian acts with another woman in private may be
charged with committing an act of gross indecency.
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it was held that “the sin of Lesbos or Reboim is clearly not
intercourse”.143
One important issue that has not been judicially considered is
whether a sexual act can be legal between a man and a woman but
constitute an unnatural offence if engaged in by two men. Indian
cases suggest that the gender of the participants is immaterial.144
Although these cases involved one male sexually assaulting another,
the judges focused solely on whether the sexual act itself con-
stituted carnal intercourse. In particular, the court in Bapoji Bhatt
was of the view that fellatio performed by one male on another
did not constitute a s 377 offence. However, the local decision
PP v Tan Kuan Meng14 5 seems to imply that the reverse is true.
Lai J’s emphasis on “natural sex” as a condition for the legality
of fellatio suggests that if it were done by one man to another
it would contravene s 377.
It is submitted that whether a particular sexual act contravenes
s 377 probably depends ultimately on whether in the circumstances,
having regard to prevailing customs and morals, the act is con-
sidered carnal intercourse against the order of nature by any
right-thinking member of the public. This was the test applied
to s 377A by Ng Huat v PP,146 and there seems no reason why
it should not apply to both the offences.
(2) Mens Rea: The offence in s 377 must be committed “volun-
tarily” by the accused. This is defined in s 39 of the Penal Code.
Supra, n 119.
See eg Bapoji Bhatt, supra, n 117; Sirkar, supra, n 129; Lohana Vasantlal
Devchand, supra, n 131. In Khanu, ibid, the victim’s sex is unclear from
the report, but like the others the case turned on whether fellatio constituted
carnal intercourse against the order of nature.
Supra, n 134.
[1995] 2 SLR 783 at 792G (HC), discussed in detail infra.
143
144
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A person does something voluntarily when he causes an effect by
means by which he intends to cause it, or he knows or has reason
to believe to be likely to cause it. The consent or otherwise of the
person submitting to the carnal intercourse is immaterial.147
B. Section 377A
1. Legislative History
Section 377A is absent from the Indian Penal Code. It was intro-
duced into our Penal Code by s 7 of the Penal Code (Amendment)
Ordinance 1938 (No 12 of 1938), and came into effect on 8 July
1938.
The reason for the addition, as stated in the Proceedings of
the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements in 1938148 was to
“[make] punishable acts of gross indecency between male persons
which do not amount to an unnatural offence within the meaning
of s 377 of the Code.” It was based on s 11 of the UK Criminal
Law Amendment Act 1885 (48 & 49 Vict c 69), now s 13 of the
UK Sexual Offences Act 1956.
The English section was introduced in the late stages of “a Bill
to make further provision for the protection of women and girls,
the suppression of brothels, and other purposes.” It was introduced
by Henry Labouchere in the House of Commons at the report
stage of the Bill, which had previously been passed by the House
of Lords where it was introduced without reference to indecency
between males. The purpose for the provision was explained thus:
That at present any person on whom an assault of the kind
dealt with was committed must be under the age of 13, and
R v Jellyman (1836) 8 C & P 604, 173 ER 637 (interpreting the English
law of buggery); PP v Victor Rajoo s/o A Pitchay Muthu, supra, n 133.
Page C81 dated 25 Apr 1938. See microfiche no 672, STRAITS SETTLE-
MENTS, Legislative Council, Proceedings (SE 102) vol 1938 (Central
Library Reprographic Dept, National University of Singapore).
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the object with which he [Labouchère] had brought forward this
clause was to make the law applicable to any person whether
under the age of 13 or over the age.149
The only question raised was whether it was in order to move an
amendment which dealt with a class of offence totally different
from those contemplated by the Bill. The Speaker ruled that any-
thing could be introduced by leave of the House. The amendment
was adopted. In considering this provision, the UK Committee
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution (the Wolfenden Com-
mittee) noted that Parliament had passed it without the detailed
consideration which such an amendment would almost certainly
receive today, even though the provision as adopted was much
wider than Labouchère’s apparent intention.150
In Singapore, during the second reading of the Penal Code
(Amendment) Bill,151 the Attorney-General justified the intro-
duction of s 377A as follows:
[I]t is unfortunately the case that acts of the nature described
have been brought to notice. As the law now stands, such acts
can only be dealt with, if at all, under the minor offences Ordin-
ance, and then only if committed in public.152 Punishment
Daily Debates, 6 Aug 1885 col 1397, cited in the Wolfenden Report,
supra, n 43 at 39 para 108. Quaere whether, as suggested in R v J (1957)
21 WWR 248 at 250 (SC, App Div, Alberta), the provision was partly a
response to the decision of R v Jacobs (1817) Russ & Ry 331, 168 ER 830,
which held that fellatio is not punishable as buggery.
Wolfenden Report, ibid.
Page B49 dated 13 Jun 1938. See microfiche no 667, STRAITS SETTLE-
MENTS, Legislative Council, Proceedings (SE 102) vol 1938. The first
reading of the Bill is at p B25 (microfiche no 666). After the second
reading the Bill was sent into committee, read for the third time, and
passed on the same day (p B50, microfiche no 667).
The Attorney-General was presumably referring to s 12(d) of the Minor
Offences Ordinance (Cap 24, 1936 Rev Ed), which imposed a fine of up
to $25 for the wilful or indecent exposure of one’s person.
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under the Ordinance is inadequate and the chances of detection
are small. It is desired, therefore, to strengthen the law and
to bring it into line with English Criminal law, from which
this clause is taken, and the law of various other parts of the
Colonial Empire of which it is only necessary to mention Hong
Kong and Gibralter [sic] where conditions are somewhat similar
to our own.
The Legislative Council’s intention in enacting s 377A was thus
to criminalise behaviour between men considered as “gross in-
decency” but not falling within s 377, even though such behaviour
might be consensual and in private. In doing so it implicitly
acknowleged that s 11 of the UK Criminal Law Amendment Act
1885 had an impact much wider than the original reason for its
introduction into the House of Commons.
2. Interpretation and Scope
377A. Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or
abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the
commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency
with another male person, shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to 2 years.
(1) Actus Reus: The actus reus of s 377A relevant to this article
is the commission of an act of gross indecency in private. Gross
indecency is not defined in the Penal Code, but is a term well-
known to English criminal law. A Concise Dictionary of Law153
defines it as a sexual act that is more than ordinary indecency
but falls short of actual intercourse. In Ng Huat v PP,l54 the
High Court held that:
2nd ed, 1990.
[1995] 2 SLR 783 at 792G (HC), citing R v K & H (1957) 21 WWR 86
at 88 (SC, Alberta, Canada). In Ng Huat v PP [1995] 2 CLAS News
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What amounts to a grossly indecent act must depend on whether
in the circumstances, and the customs and morals of our times,
it would be considered grossly indecent by any right-thinking
member of the public. . . The court does not sit to impose its
own moral standards or precepts, but to enforce the morals of
the general public.
Gross indecency includes masturbation155 and indecent phys-
ical contact,156 or even indecent behaviour without any physical
contact.157 The Wolfenden Report158 was of the view that gross
indecency covered any act involving sexual indecency between
two male persons:
From the police reports we have seen and the other evidence we
have received it appears that the offence usually takes one of
three forms; either there is mutual masturbation; or there is
some form of intercrural contact; or oral-genital contact (with
or without emission) takes place. Occasionally the offence make
take a more recondite form; techniques in heterosexual relations
vary considerably, and the same is true of homosexual relations.
(2) Mens rea: Section 377A is silent as to the mens rea required
8 (HC), permission was refused for questions of law arising out of the
case to be referred to the Court of Appeal. Yong Pung How CJ held that
although the phrase “gross indecency” had hitherto not been judicially
interpreted in Singapore, this did not in itself mean it was a question of
law of public interest within the meaning of s 60 of the Supreme Court
of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1985 Rev Ed).
The only other reported case on s 377A is R v Captain Douglas Marr
[1946] MLJ 77 (SC, Straits Settlements), but there was no discussion in
this decision on the elements of the offence.
Eg R v Preece [1977] QB 370 (CA).
Eg R v Burrows [1952] 1 All ER 58n (CCA); Ng Huat v PP, supra, n 154.
R v Hunt [1950] 2 All ER 291.
Supra, n 43 at 38 para 104.
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for the offence. Thus it may either be considered a strict liab-
ility offence, or the presumption of mens rea approach may be
followed.159
C. Impact of Sections 377 and 377A
We have seen that if the participants’ gender is a relevant factor
in determining whether sexual acts fall within s 377, most forms
of penetrative sexual behaviour between two men might well be
considered unnatural offences. However, if gender is irrelevant,
certain types of sexual intercourse such as fellatio might not
contravene s 377 even between homosexuals. It also seems that
the provision does not cover non-penetrative sexual acts such
as mutual masturbation. However, sexual behaviour not covered
by s 377 would probably fall within “gross indecency” under
s 377A. Therefore, where homosexuals are concerned, all forms
of sexual behaviour are probably unlawful.
IV. WHY SECTIONS 377 AND 377A ARE
DISCRIMINATORY
A. Inequality on the Face of the Statute
1. Section 377
Since s 377 applies to all persons, it appears on its face not
to violate Art 12(1).I60 However, it is submitted that s 377 is
See CMV Clarkson, “Rape: Emasculation of the Penal Code” [1988]
1 MLJ cxiii at cxvii-cxx for a lucid discussion. See also Koh, Clarkson
& Morgan, supra, n 115 at 76-98.
But note that a facially-neutral statute purporting to criminalise a certain
form of behaviour among all persons is still invalid if its impetus and
effect is really to discourage such behaviour among a limited class only:
Note, “Sexual Orientation and the Law” (1989) 102 Harv L Rev 1509
at 1531.
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not facially-neutral because it may forbid certain sexual acts
by homosexuals but not by heterosexuals, and does not forbid
lesbian sexual acts at all.161 Moreover the section disproportion-
ately impacts homosexuals since it criminalises their primary
means of sexual activity. Under heightened review, discrimination
is established if the provision causes disproportionate impact on
the suspect or quasi-suspect class and there is proof of discrim-
inatory intent on the legislature’s part. In Nordin bin Salleh v
Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan,162  it was held that to deter-
mine if a statute infringes a particular fundamental right, the
court must ask itself:
what is the direct and inevitable consequence or effect of the
impugned statute on the fundamental right of the plaintiffs,
and if the effect of the statute on the fundamental rights is
direct or inevitable, then a fortiori the effect must be presumed
to have been intended by the statute. Where, therefore, the statute
directly affects the fundamental right, or its inevitable effect
on the fundamental right is such that it makes the exercise of
the right ineffective or illusory, the statute must be held to be
unconstitutional, and must be struck down.
It is submitted that the provision may even be unconstitutional
under rational review since its entire premise is inherently bad.
(1) Enforcement of Religious and Moral Values: Sodomy was
originally made an offence because of Biblical prohibitions of
the practice. This is no longer fitting as a justification of the
offence in society today. It is inappropriate for the criminal law
to impose perceptions of a particular religious group onto non-
believers. In People v Onofre163  it was held inter alia that “it is
Supra, nn 142-46 and the accompanying text.
[1992] 1 MLJ 343 at 357 (HC, Kuala Lumpur), applying Maneka Gandhi
v Union of India [1978] AIR SC 597.
(1980) 415 NE 2d 936 at 940 n 3 (majority opinion).
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not the function of the Penal Law... to provide either a medium
for the articulation or the apparatus for the intended enforcement
of the enforcement of moral or theological values...”
Apart from religious grounds, anti-sodomy laws have been
justified on the ground that permitting private consensual sodomy
would promote immorality, resulting in rejection of moral values
such as fidelity in marriage and family responsibilities. It is true
that homosexual behaviour on the part of husbands has broken up
marriages, and homosexuals may not enter into marriages which
might otherwise have been successfully consummated.164 But it is
unlikely that anti-sodomy laws have made much difference. It is
hard to see how such laws strengthen traditional marriages. In fact,
such reasoning suggests that the homosexual preference is strong
and the heterosexual preference weak, and that conventional family
life is so unattractive that people would abandon it if sodomy
were legitimised. This is patently untrue. Homosexuals make up
only a minority of the population,165 and marriage is a well-
established institution.
Furthermore, extra-marital sex and lesbianism inflict just as
much damage on family life as homosexuality.166 In the Bible
heterosexual immorality is as sinful as homosexuality.167 It is
Wolfenden Report, supra, n 43 at 22 para 55.
Estimates of the percentage of homosexuals in the United States popula-
tion range from 10% Kinsey, 1948) to 1% (Guttmacher, 1993), though
figures are disputed. See “The Impact on Gay Political Power”, Newsweek,
26 April 1993 at 45; Ward & Swarts, above, n 54 at 374-75, 378-79. The
most comprehensive study (Laumann, Michael & Michaels, 1994) conducted
in the United States since Kinsey’s survey revealed that 2.7% of men and
1.3% of women reported having homosexual sex in 1993. 7.1% of men
and 3.8% of women reported having homosexual sex since puberty, while
6.2% of men and 4.4% of women reported being sexually attracted to
people of the same gender: “Now For the Truth About Americans and Sex”
Time, 17 October 1994 at 40, 43. No local studies have been published.
Wolfenden Report, supra, n 43 at 22 para 55.
Lev 20:10: “If a man commits adultery with the wife of his neighbour,
166
167
164
165
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incongruous that the legislature has seen fit to leave society to deal
with these problems, but criminalized only homosexual behaviour
between males. The Wolfenden Report concluded that private
morality should not influence criminal law unless it endangers
public order, the safety of citizens, or causes persons to risk ex-
ploitation or corruption by others, and therefore private consensual
sexual activity should not be regulated by the government.168 In
its view:
Unless a deliberate attempt is to be made by society, acting
through the agency of the law, to equate the sphere of crime
with that of sin, there must remain a realm of private morality
and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the
law’s business. To say this is not to condone or encourage private
immorality. On the contrary, to emphasise the personal and
private nature of moral or immoral conduct is to emphasise
the personal and private responsibility of the individual for his
own actions, and that is a responsibility which a mature agent
can properly be expected to carry for himself without the threat
of punishment from the law.169
(2) Reducing the Spread of HIV/AIDS: In the early 1980s Amer-
ican men who had experienced homosexual contact constituted
70% of reported cases of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).170 Due to the high incidence of Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus (HIV) infection and AIDS among male homosexuals,
both the adulterer and adulteress shall be put to death.” Heb 13:4: “Let
marriage be held in honour among all, and let the marriage bed be un-
defiled; for God will judge the immoral and adulterous.”
Wolfenden Report, supra, n 43 at 23-24, 48.
Ibid at 24 para 61.
Selik, Haverkos & Curran, “Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS):
Trends in the US, 1978-1982” (1984) 76 Amer J of Med 394 at 499.
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it was postulated that anti-sodomy laws help to prevent the spread
of the fatal disease.
But recent estimates indicate that heterosexual infection in
the United States is increasing while infection in other groups is
stable or decreasing from peak rates occurring in the early and
mid-1980s.171 This is borne out by data from other countries, in-
cluding Singapore where studies show that from the mid-1990s HIV
transmission has changed from one that was predominantly homo-
sexual or bisexual to one that it is increasingly heterosexual.172 It
is no longer accurate to characterise HIV/AIDS as a “gay disease”.
RJ Bigger & PS Rosenberg, “HIV Infection/AIDS in the United States
During the 1990s” (1993) 17 (Supp 1) Clin Infect Dis S219. The Centres
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia, also reported
that in 1993 gay men accounted for less than half of the new AIDS cases
in the US. Heterosexual cases rose more sharply than any other category,
constituting 9% of cases recorded in 1993 (an increase from 2% in 1985).
The report concluded that anyone having unprotected sex with multiple
partners is at risk: see “Danger Signs”, Newsweek, 21 March 1994 at 45.
SK Chew, “Trends in Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection: Epi-
demiology in Singapore” (1993) 22(2) Ann Acad Med S’pore 142. The
infection rate among heterosexuals increased from 27% of all cases in
1985-90 to 72% in 1993, while among homosexuals it fell from 53% to
11%. The rate among bisexuals remained stable (20% compared to 17%);
“Anti-Aids Campaign to Target Casual Sex”, The Straits Times, 25 No-
vember 1993 at 1. Since 1993, the heterosexual infection rate has remained
at over 70%. Of the 20 new cases reported between April and June 1995,
17 were heterosexual, 2 were bisexual and 1 was homosexual. Since 1985,
when the first case was detected, 348 Singaporeans have contracted HIV.
Of these, 47 have full-blown AIDS, 197 are HIV-positive without symptoms
of AIDS yet, and 104 have died: “HIV Caught Mainly From Partners of
Opposite Sex”, The Straits Times, 2 August 1995 at 21.
The Malaysian position is similar. As of January 1995, 11,175 infection
cases have been reported. Of these, 200 have developed full-blown AIDS
and 150 have died. Heterosexual infection rates have increased steadily,
reaching about 10% in 1994: “More Cases of Aids Spread Through Hetero-
sexual Sex”, The Sunday Times, 12 March 1995 at 20.
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In any case, anti-sodomy provisions are not drafted to deal with
HIV/AIDS. They are over-inclusive since they cover homosexuals
who are not HIV-infected, and under-inclusive as they exclude
heterosexuals who are. If homosexuals constitute a quasi-suspect
or suspect class, then such over- and under-inclusiveness cannot
be tolerated. For the criminal law is to be useful at all to contain
the AIDS epidemic, provisions should be closely tailored to in-
clude only HIV-positive individuals. Risk of sexual transmission
depends on sexual acts and not the gender or sexual orientation
of the participants. However the use of criminal sanctions against
AIDS is probably ineffective, for risks of punishment are usually
the last things on the minds of people in moments of pleasure.
Punitive policies may discourage HIV-infected persons from seeking
counselling and treatment. Regular public education is more likely
to modify high-risk sexual activity.173 Disclosure requirements,
precautions, and tort suits have also been suggested as better
alternatives.174
2. Section 377A
The English equivalent of s 377A was introduced in the House
of Commons to prevent indecent assault. However, the breadth
TKK Iyer, “Containment of AIDS in Singapore – Legal and Policy Im-
plications” (1993) 22(1) Ann Acad Med S’pore 111 at 112. For a general
discussion on the legislative control of AIDS in Singapore, see Elaine Lee,
Lee Woon Shiu & Margaret Law Yuh Tyng, “AIDS and the Law” (1994)
15 Sing LR 213. Note, though, the inaccuracy on p 238 n 51: the defendants
in CLB v PP [1993] 1 SLR 598 (HC) were convicted under s 182 of the
Penal Code (Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed) for giving false evidence to the Medical
Director of the Singapore Blood Transfusion Service by filling in their
blood donor registration forms wrongly. They were not charged under
s 20C of the Infectious Diseases Act (Cap 137, 1985 Rev Ed) introduced
by the Infectious Diseases (Amendment) Act 1992 (No 5 of 1992) as they
did not know they were HIV-positive at the time of the offence.
Supra, n 160 at 1530.
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of the provisions actually enacted in England and Singapore
point strongly to an intention to deliberately criminalise private
consensual male homosexual acts not amounting to carnal inter-
course under s 377. Section 377A is thus discriminatory because
such sexual behaviour in heterosexuals and lesbians is not similarly
prohibited.
B. Selective Enforcement175
Section 377 is also discriminatory if it can be proved that it is
selectively enforced against homosexuals.176 Up to 1995, only
five cases involving s 377 could be located (four of them invol-
ving heterosexual offences committed in the course of a rape),177
making it impossible to tell if selective enforcement is a trend in
Singapore.178 The paucity of cases may in fact suggest we have
Ibid at 1533.
See Yick Wo v Hopkins (1886) 118 US 356 at 373-74 (discriminatory
intent of board administering laundry-licensing law inferred from pattern
of refusing licences to all Chinese applicants and granting licences to
nearly all Caucasian applicants).
Kanagasuntharam, supra, n 125; Jumahat, supra, n 125; Victor Rajoo,
supra, n 133; Tan Kuan Meng, supra, n 134. The facts of the last case,
Ahmad bin Hassan v PP [1958J MLJ 186 (CCA, Kuala Lumpur), were
not disclosed in the report.
However newspaper reports show that law enforcement officers often
carry out undercover entrapment of homosexuals. For example, in March
1992, several men were arrested at a beach in East Coast Park which
had been used as a homosexual meeting place. They were charged with
outraging the modesty of undercover police under s 354 of the Penal Code:
see The Straits Times and The New Paper, 10-11 March 1992. It may have
been the notoriety of this crackdown that helped it make the papers; in
any case it is rare to see news of heterosexual couples being arrested for
similar offences. In Tan Boon Hock v PP [1994] 2 SLR 150 at 152F-H,
Yong Pung How CJ found it “disquieting” that accused persons arrested
as a result of ’anti-gay’ operations aimed at ‘flushing-out’ homosexuals
should subsequently be charged with having outraged the modesty of the
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to thank the Attorney-General for exercising his discretion not to
prosecute instances of private homosexual behaviour. However
the mere non-enforcement of a law is not a good reason for
keeping it in the statute books if it is established that the law
is unconstitutional.
In any case, selective enforcement is virtually impossible to
establish in court since such cases are highly fact-dependent and
must include proof of intentional or purposeful discriminatory
enforcement to succeed.
V. CONCLUSION
In January and February 1992, a Censorship Review Committee
was set up to conduct a survey to determine if there was a change
in the moral values of Singaporeans over the last ten years.
Although the perception was that moral values had become more
liberal, the study found that a majority of respondents were
actually more conservative than their counterparts a decade ago.
A majority disapproved of moral issues such as pre-marital sex,
cohabitation, extra-marital sex, and homosexuality and lesbianism
because of religious beliefs and moral principles.179
In particular, 86% of respondents disapproved of homosexuality
and lesbianism as a way of life. Of these respondents, 44% dis-
approved on moral and religious grounds, 25% because they
viewed such behaviour as “not acceptable in society”, and 14%
because of the fear of AIDS and other sexually-transmitted
diseases.180
police officers they came into contact with, since it was at least arguable
that consent from the police officers had been forthcoming.
Censorship Review Committee, Survey on Changing Moral Values and
Public Perception of Certain Printed, Audio and Visual Materials: Report
(1992) at 3-4.
Ibid at 31-36.
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179
180
The report comes at a time of greater consciousness about
homosexuals in society.181 There has been a proliferation of
books, plays, art exhibitions and films with homosexual themes.
Controversy has raged in the United States over the causes of
homosexuality and whether the Clinton administration should
have ended the military’s ban on homosexuals serving in the
uniformed services.182
Divided as people are over the acceptability of alternative life-
styles, it is one thing to disapprove of somebody’s behaviour on
moral grounds but quite another to subject him or her to criminal
sanctions. It is submitted that the legislature, in enacting ss 377
and 377A of the Penal Code, has discriminated against male
homosexuals as compared to lesbians and heterosexuals, infringing
the right of equal protection in our Constitution. Although ss 377
and 377A may pass the rational nexus test, they are unconsti-
tutional since the object of the sections is inherently bad. In
addition, ss 377 and 377A are discriminatory under intermediate
or even strict scrutiny since homosexuals form a quasi-suspect
or suspect class. The scheme of Art 12, judicial and academic
pronouncements, and public policy all support the application of
strict scrutiny as a part of equal protection doctrine in Malaysia
and Singapore. Intermediate review is applicable by analogy. Hence
it is submitted that ss 377 and 377A should be read183 to prohibit
For a rare local view, see LP Kok, YG Ang, YH Fong & SHC Siew, “Profile
of a Homosexual in Singapore” (1991) 32 Sing Med J 403.
Newsweek, 23 November 1992 at 32; 1 February 1993 at 38; The Straits
Times, 26 January 1993 at 8, 27 January 1993 at 8, 29 January 1993
at 10, 30 January 1993 at 4, 31 January 1993 at 6.
Article 4 (the supremacy clause) does not apply because the Penal Code
was enacted before the commencement of the Constitution. However, the
court is empowered by Art 162 to construe all laws existing at the time of
the commencement of the Constitution with such modifications, adapta-
tions, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring them
into confirmity with the Constitution.
181
182
183
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only male rape, homosexual acts with minors (whether consensual
or not) and sexual activity in public places which would offend
sensibilities. More preferably, the sections should be done away
with and replaced with more suitable provisions.184
The criminal law, with its strong emphasis on retribution,
deterrence and incapacitation, is a completely inappropriate way
to deal with the issue. Punishment is severe: a man who engages
in consensual intercourse with another in the privacy of his home
can be sentenced to life imprisonment or up to ten years’ imprison-
ment if convicted under s 377, or up to two years’ imprisonment
under s 377A. The same penalties are respectively imposed for
culpable homicide and causing death by a rash or negligent
act.185 Surely such punishment is too harsh for acts which are
at worst only morally outrageous.
It was recently commented that, “Historically, [American]
society has failed to address the plight of homosexuals in a res-
ponsible, compassionate manner. Too often in the past, people
with homosexual tendencies were marginalised, branded as faggots
and dykes. The emergence of a militant gay rights movement is,
in many respects, the consequence of the cold, insensitive manner
in which gays were treated in the past.”186 Such a situation has
not yet occurred in Singapore, but we would do well not to repeat
the mistakes of others.
See, eg, the new s 1(1) of the UK Sexual Offences Act 1956 (c 69), inserted
by s 142 of the UK Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (c 33),
which makes it an offence for a man to rape a woman or another man.
Rape has been redefined as sexual intercourse (whether vaginal or anal)
with another person if that person does not consent, the perpetrator
knowing that the victim does not consent or reckless as to whether he or
she consents.
Penal Code, ss 304 and 304A respectively.
Ward & Swarts, supra, n 54 at 381.
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This article must not be read as condoning, accepting or affirm-
ing the homosexual lifestyle.187 The toleration and respect that I
show for you as a person does not mandate that I accept your
viewpoints as truth. However those of us who make up the hetero-
sexual majority have a responsibility to respect homosexuals as
persons and protect them from discrimination and abuse, regardless
of how distasteful we find their behaviour. This is the essence
of equal protection: understanding should be shown to all mar-
ginalised groups in society, regardless of their nature. Change
must be effected through the pricking of personal consciences
by social, moral and religious teachings, not the infamous blunt
instrument of the criminal law.188
APPENDIX
Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws
of England: Concerning High Treason, and Other Pleas of the
Crown and Criminall Causes (2nd ed, 1648) at 58-59
CAP X
Of Buggery, or Sodomy
If any person shall commit buggery with mankind,
or beast; by authority of Parliament this offence is
adjudged felony without benefit of Clergy. But it
is to be known, (that I may observe it once and for
Ward & Swarts, ibid at 380-81; Morton A Kaplan, “Common Sense on
Gay Rights” (1993) 8(10) The World & I 397 at 401.
People v Onofre, supra, n 163: “[T]he community and its members are
entirely free to employ theological teaching, moral suasion, parental advice,
psychological and psychiatric counselling and other non-coercive means
to condemn the practice of consensual sodomy.”
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25 H 8 ca 6
5 Eliz ca 17
1 Mar ubi sup
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all) that the statute of 25 H 8 was repealed by the
statute of 1 Mar, whereby all offences made felony
or Premunire by an Act of Parliament made since
1 H 8 were generally repealed, but 25 H 8. is revived
by 5 Eliz.
Buggery is a detestable, and abominable sin,
amongst Christians not to be named, committed
by carnall knowledge against the ordinance of the
Creator, and other of nature, by mankind with
mankind, or with brute beast, or by womankind
with brute beast.
Bugeria is an Italian word, and signifies to much,
as is before described, Pœderastes or Paiderestes is
a Greek word, Amator purerorum, which is but a
Species of Buggery, and it was complained of in
Parliament, that the Lumbaros had brought into
the Realm the shamefull sin of Sodomy, that is not
to be named, as there it is said. Our ancient Authors
doe conclude, that it deserveth death, ultimum
supplicium, though they differ in the manner of the
punishment. Britton saith, that Sodomites and Mis-
creants shall be burnt: and so were the Sodomites by
Almighty God. Fleta saith, Pecorantes & Sodomitœ
in terra vivi confodiantur. and therewith agreeth the
Mirror, pur le grand abhomination, and in another
place, be saith, Sodomie est crime de Majeste, vers
le Roy celestre. But (to say it once and for all) the
judgement in all cases of felony is, that the person
attainted be hanged by the neck, untill he, or she
be dead. But in ancient times in that case, the man
was hanged, & the woman was drowned, whereof
we have seen examples in the reign of R 1. And this
is the meaning of ancient Franchsses granted de
Furca & Fossa, of the Gallows, and the Pit, for the
Horrendum
illud peccatum.
5 El ca 17
Rot Parl 50 E 3
nu 58
Britton ca 9
Gen 19.9
Rom c 1.17
FNB 269a
Fleta li 1 ca 35
Mirror ca 4 §
de Majesty 1
§ 15 & cap 2
Sect 11.
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hanging upon the one, and the drowning in the other;
but Fossa is taken away, and Furca remains.
Cum mesculo non commiscearis coitu foemineo,
quio abominatio est. Cum omnipecore non coibis,
nee maculaberis cum eo: Mulier non succumbet
jumento, nec miscebitur ei, quia seculus est, &c.
The Act of 25 H 8 hath adjudged it felony, and
therefore the judgement for felony doth now belong
to this offence, viz to be hanged by the neck till he
be dead. He that readeth the Preamble of this Act,
shall finde how necessary the reading of our ancient
Authors is: The statute doth take away the benefit
of Clergy from the Delinquent. But now let us peruse
the words of the said description of Buggery.
Levit 18.22,23.
1 Tim 1.10
• Detestable and abominable.] These just attributes
are found in the Act of 25 H 8.
• Amongst Christians not to be named.] These
words are in the usuall Indictment of this offence,
and are in effect in the Parliament Roll of 50 E 3
Ubi supra nu 58.
• By carnall knowledg, &c.] The words of the In-
dictment be, Contra ordinationem Creatoris, &
naturae ordinem, rem habuit veneream, dictumque
puerum carnaliter* cognovit, &c. So as there must
be penetratio, that is, res in re, either with mankind,
or with beast, but the least penetration maketh it
carnall knowledge.a See the indictment of Stafford,
which was drawn by great advise, for committing
* This is
grounded upon
the Word of
God. viz Gen
19.4,5.
Judges 19.22.
Ut
cognoscamus
cos.
a Coke lib Intr
352 Mich 5.
Ja Coram rege.
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buggery with a boy; for which he was attainted,
and hanged.
bThe Sodomites came to this abomination by
four means, viz by pride, excesse of diet, idlenesse,
and contempt of the poor. Otiosus nihil cogitat, nisi
de operatus est nefas, & morte moriatur. And this
accordeth with the ancient Rule of law, Agentes &
consentientes pari pœna plectentur.
Emissio seminis maketh it not Buggery, but is
an evidence in case of buggery of penetration: and
so in Rape the words be also carnaliter cognovit,
and therefore there must be penetration; and emissio
seminis without penetration maketh no Rape.c Vide
in the Chapter of Rape. If the party buggered be
within the age of discretion, it is no felony in him,
but in the agent only. When any offence is fel-
ony either by the Common law, or by statute, all
Accessories both before and after, are incidently
included.d So if any be present, abetting and aiding
any to do the act, though the offence be personall,
and to be done by one only, as to commit rape, not
only he that doth the act is a principall, ebut also
they that be present, abetting, and aiding the mis-
doer, are principalls also, which is a proof of the
other case of Sodomy.
• Or by woman.] This is within the Purvien of this
Act of 25 H 8. For the words be, if any person, &c,
which extend as well to a woman, as to a man, and
therefore if she commit buggery with a beast; she
is a person that commits buggery with a beast, to
which end this word [person] was used. And the
rather, for that somewhat before the making of this
b Ezek 16.49.
Gen 18.29.
Deut 29.23
Esay 13.19.
Jer 23.14.
49.18. 50.4
Luke 17.28,29.
2 Pet 2.6
Jud vers 7.
Rom 1.26,27.
Sapient 10.6,7
c Levit 20.13.
1 Cor c 6 v 10.
d 3 & 4 P &
Mar Justice
Dalisons
Reports.
Stanf Pl Cor.
Pl com 97.
e 11 H 4 13.
See the 2 parts
of the
Institutes in
the exposition
upon the
statute of W 1
ca 13 and W 2
ca 34.
Act, a great Lady had committed buggery with a
Baboon, and conceived by it, &c.
There be four sins in holy Scripture called Clamantia peccata,
crying sins; inherent this detestable sin is one, expressed in this
Distichon.
Sunt vox clamorum, vox sanguinis, & Sodomorum;
Vox oppressorum, mnerces detenta laborum.
Notes
Coke was among the first to wrongly attribute buggery to the Italians who
presumably adopted the practice from the “Lumbards”. This probably led to
his incorrect derivation of the word buggery from the Italian bugeria. The
correct etymology is from the Latin Bulgarus meaning “Bulgarian”. There was
a widespread belief that heretics from Bulgaria encouraged such practices.
At common law, the “age of discretion” was 14. Buggery could not be com-
mitted by a boy under 14: R v Tatam (1921) 15 Cr App Rep 132; a person not
under 14 could be convicted of the offence although the agent was under 14:
R v Allen (1849) 1 Den 364, 169 ER 282. Section 1 of the UK Sexual Offences
Act 1993 (c 30) has abolished the presumption of criminal law that a boy under
14 is incapable of sexual intercourse, whether natural or unnatural. In Singapore,
nothing is an offence which is done by a child under 7 years of age: Penal Code,
s 82. A child above seven but under 12 only has a good defence if he has not
attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequence
of his conduct: Penal Code, s 83.
16 Sing LR Equal Protection and Sexual Orientation 285
